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This thesis describes, extends, and explores the validity
of Hatzopoulos Naval Combat Model of modern surface warship
missile engagements.
An extensive sensitivity analysis is conducted to
determine how the model's output is affected by changes in
force alertness and scouting effectiveness. The approach
taken is to analyze the sensitivity of combat (missile
exchange) results first through the use of ratios, and second
by examining partial derivatives.
Two ratios are developed. The first is a ratio of
remaining staying power after the exchange of salvoes. The
second is a fractional exchange ratio , which compares the
fraction of combat power remaining on the two sides after an
exchange.
The robustness of the fractional exchange ratio as an
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A mathematical model is a mathematical construct which is
designed to study a particular real-world system or
phenomenon. According to Giordano and Weir, a mathematical
model can be a formula, an eguation, or a system of equations
that describes how the underlying factors are interrelated
[Ref. l:p. 32]. The purpose of a model is to
describe, explain, or predict. Models also are used to carry
out sensitivity analyses, helping to provide a starting point
for making decisions.
The goodness of a model depends on how well it succeeds in
its intended purpose. The closer it approximates the real-
world situation it represents, the greater is its value. As
noted by Hughes, "A model is useful if a better decision can
be made with the information that it adds"
[Ref. 2:p. 17].
A military model is a special type of model. Such models
must be able to represent complicated scenarios, must be
simple to activate and use, and must produce reasonable
results. A naval battle model is one type of military model.
Its purpose is to help the tactical commander in thinking
about how best to apply his forces to win a naval engagement
(or at least minimize the losses) . A naval battle model must
be characterized by simple measures of the aggregate combat
power and staying power of the opposite forces. In addition
to mathematical models, models for naval battle planning
include fleet exercises, interactive war games, and computer
simulations [Ref. 2:p. 165].
B. A NAVAL COMBAT MODEL
One comprehensive mathematical model of naval combat was
developed by Lt. Thomas Beall, based on Hughes's naval warfare
concept [Ref. 3:p. 17]. Beall's model provides
an excellent example of a useful military model designed
specifically for naval combat. We now summarize his model.
The material in this section is a summary of the work done by
Lt. Thomas Beall [Ref. 3].
1. Definitions
The following definitions are used by Beall in
defining his model:
• Firepower kill : A platform has suffered a firepower kill
if its combat power diminishes to zero, so it cannot
contribute combat power to its force.
• 1000 - pound bomb equivalent (TPBE) : TPBE is equal to the
explosive power of 660 pounds of TNT and is a unit of
destruction (that is, the explosive power of a 1000-pound
bomb in World War II) . The explosive power of all weapons
is expressed in multiples of TPBE.
• Staying power (SP) : The staying power of a platform is the
number of TPBE hits necessary to inflict a firepower kill
on that platform.
• Weapon effectiveness (PC) : Weapon effectiveness is the
probability that a single shell fired from a group's main
battery gun will strike the target.
• Theoretical combat power (FC) : The theoretical combat
power of a given weapon type is the number of TPBEs per
minute which a platform can fire in a single salvo.
• Effective combat power (EFC) : Effective combat power is
the number of TPBEs per minute fired from a group's main
battery guns which strike their targets.
• Indices used in the model are as follows:
i = Weapon
j = Platform (ship)
k = Group
1 = Blue force
1' = Red force.
2 . Characteristic Values for a Platform
An important respect of Beall's thesis is that he used
historical combat data to determine the values to use in his
model
.
a. Staying power . The staying power (SP) of platform
j in group k of force 1 is computed as a function of its full
load displacement. This is a characteristic of each platform
(ship)
:
SPjkl = 0.07 x ( full load displacement ) 1/3 (1-1)
b. Theoretical combat power . The theoretical combat
power (FC) is the number of TPBEs fired per minute by weapon
i of platform j in group k of force 1:
7-.^. weight .„ .. „ xFCi^i = ssn 7ho X Wtg ' (1 ' 2)660 lbs
where : weight = Explosive weight which the weapon fires per
per minute in pounds of TNT,
wtg = 2.5, for gunnery ordnance.
The theoretical combat power of a platform j in group k of
force 1 is given by summing the theoretical combat power of
each individual weapon of the platform.
FCJki = £ FCiJ*i- (1.3)
The aggregate staying power (SP) and the theoretical
combat power (FC) of a group k in force 1, calculated as a
single unit, are given by:
SPk i E 5pJ*i V£ , VI ( 1.4)
jeJc
and
FCkl = Y. FCJ*i *k > Vi - (1-5)
J'e*
c. Effective combat power . The effective combat power
(EFC) of a group k in force 1 is computed as follows:
EFCkl = FCkl x PCkl . (1.6)
3 . Model Description
The terms SPkl ( t) and FCkl ( t) represent the aggregate
staying power and theoretical combat power of a group k in
force 1 at time step t. If the force 1' is the attacking
force, the aggregate staying power (TS(t)) of the group under
attack and the aggregate effective combat power (AEFC(t)) of
the attacking group are as follows:
and
TSU) = £ SPkl (t-l) , (1 . 7)
Jc being attacked by I 1
AEFC(t) = £ FCkl , (t-1) x PCkl , (1 . 8 )
Jc firing 1
'
where: SPkl ( t-1) = Staying power of group k of force 1 at the
end of time step (t-1)
.
FCkl /( t-1) = Theoretical combat power of group k of
force 1' at the end of time step (t-1).
The defender's continuous fire loss percentage (LC) is
computed as the ratio of AEFC to TS
:
LC = AEFC . (1.9)
TS '
Therefore, the staying power (SP) and the theoretical
combat power (FC) can be computed for each iterative time step
as follows:
f SPkl ( fc-1) x (1-LC) V7c under attack
SPkl (t) = \ (1.10)SPkl (t-l) otherwise ,
and
( FCkl (t-1) x (1-LC) Vk under attack
FCkl (t) = (1.11)FCkl (t-l) otherwise .
The total values of each force at all discrete time steps
t can be used to represent the aggregate staying power (SP)
and the theoretical combat power (FC)
:
SP2 (t) = J2 SPki ( t) , (1.12)
k
and
FC2 ( t) = Y, FCki ( t] • (1-13)
C. HUMAN FACTORS IN A NAVAL COMBAT MODEL
Although Beall's model is both comprehensive and useful,
it does not include either human-related combat factors or
modern missiles. In 1990 Lt. Epaminondas Hatzopoulos
developed a Modern Naval Combat Model based on Beall's model,
but including various human-related factors such as scouting
effectiveness, training, morale, and leadership
[Ref. 4:p. 49]. Hatzopoulos ' s model extends
Beall's model in four ways:
• It includes missiles, the most effective weapon of today's
naval battles.
• It takes into account the defensive ability of both
forces.
• It incorporates scouting effectiveness and alertness in
defense for both opponents.
• It incorporated several important human factors that
affect the outcome of a battle. These factors are
discussed below.
1. Scouting Effectiveness
Scouting has played an important role in naval history
from the earliest times of sailing ships to the present time
of missile warships. Scouting is the gathering of useful
combat information, such as the precise position of the enemy
and his combat capabilities. Good scouting can result in
victory for an otherwise inferior fleet. One aim of this
thesis will be to determine under what battle conditions a
scouting advantage will win.
Scouting provides a distinct advantage to the force
which is most effective at it. On the other hand, scouting
may also reduce the number of forces which can be drawn upon
for firepower if they are engaged in reconnaissance
activities.
2 . Training and Experience
Well-trained troops perform better in difficult
situations. If a large differential in training and
experience exists between two opposing sides, battle outcome
may be determined by this factor.
In his book Fleet Tactics , Hughes includes an
observation from Aristotle's Ethics which emphasizes the
importance of training: "We learn how to do things by doing
the things we are learning how to do"
[Ref. 5:p. 49].
All military personnel must be expertly trained in
their domains. Training must begin in peacetime and continue
until the time comes in battle when what has been learned is
used. This is especially true aboard a warship, where each
person works individually, yet all those in a group must know
what to do and when to do it, after battle begins.
3. Morale
According to Watson, several factors affect morale
during combat. These are summarized as follows:
• The results of the first encounter . If the first battle
has been fought and won, this successful encounter helps
morale rise.
• The emotional support provided by informal leaders (those
who "take charge," whether or not they have formal
authority)
.
• The number of casualties incurred . Reducing physical
casualties helps greatly in maintaining high morale.
• The cohesiveness of the group . Morale is much higher if
personnel are trained in small groups and kept together
all the time. These "teams" have better esprit de corps .
[Ref. 6:p. 231]
It is difficult to quantify morale. However, Dupuy
has proposed a set of numerical values for five levels of
morale [Ref. 7:p. 231]. These are shown in
Table I.
TABLE I. DUPUY'S QUANTIFICATION OF MORALE LEVELS







The United States Army Field Manual 22-100 states that
"leadership traits are distinguishing personality qualities
which, if demonstrated in daily activities, help the commander
to earn the respect, confidence, willing obedience, and loyal
cooperation of the men" [Ref. 8:p. 8]. Thus
leadership is a phenomenon comprising many factors. The way
a leader is perceived is a function of human temperament,
group dynamics, and the situation. Hatzopoulos showed,
through his equations, the manner in which leadership plays
its role in combat, and in this way offers hope that the value
of good leadership can be quantified [Ref. 4].
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D. MODEL VALIDATION
Most military mod"- ' ~ J4knu" u "1 ^.m. This
stems from difficulty ning what
is to be the standard ^/. // < + j re it, is(/< /., '.+ /o
perhaps the most d r /**>*/ iR tne
validation process.
Two kinds of rea] ilable to
use for validating a \ >. results,
and the results of Exercise
results are usually cc .de fairly
accurate and numerous ««.— , u u as valid
as the assumptions made in designing, planning, and carrying
out the exercise. Actual historical results have more
validity, but reliable data is difficult to acquire
(especially about the enemy) and often very difficult
interpret: wartime data is "dirty data." [Ref. 2:p. 293]
Hatzopoulos ' s model appears to be a reasonable one.
However, as Hatzopoulos points out, it must be validated
before its usefulness can be judged [Ref. 4:p. 84]. He
proposes two ways his model might be validated:
• Perform an extensive sensitivity analysis on the model to
determine how sensitive the outcomes predicted by the
model are to the model parameters.
• Analyze the data from a small number of existing
historical missile or pulse naval battles using the model.
The validity of the model will be assessed and a better
sense of appropriate values for some of the model
parameters obtained.
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E. THESIS GOAL AND SCOPE
The goal of this thesis is to initiate the validation of
Hatzopoulos ' s Modern Naval Combat Model by carrying out an
extensive sensitivity analysis. This validation has been
accomplished in two steps.
First, the model was used to analyze the hypothetical data
from several missile and pulse weapon naval battles. Model
results were then examined from the standpoint of
"reasonableness .
"
Second, sensitivity analyses were carried out to determine
how sensitive the model's output is to changes in the inputs
for various model parameters. The term sensitivity , as noted
by Giordano and Weir, refers to the degree of change in a
model's conclusions as some condition upon which they depend
is varied; the greater the change, the more sensitive is the
model to that condition [Ref. l:p. 40].
Chapter II summarizes Hatzopoulos ' s Modern Naval Combat
Model and its origins. The major eguations and submodels are
described to provide clear understanding of how they are to be
interpreted and how they interact.
Chapter III describes a measure of combat effectiveness
developed by Barr, Weir, and Hoffman, as described in their
paper, "Evaluation of Combat ." They refer to their measure as




Most military models have a credibility problem. This
stems from difficulties in validating them. Determining what
is to be the standard of reality, and how to measure it, is
perhaps the most difficult problem encountered in the
validation process.
Two kinds of real-world data are currently available to
use for validating a battle model: training exercise results,
and the results of historical naval battles. Exercise
results are usually complete, specific, and can provide fairly
accurate and numerous data. However, they are only as valid
as the assumptions made in designing, planning, and carrying
out the exercise. Actual historical results have more
validity, but reliable data is difficult to acquire
(especially about the enemy) and often very difficult
interpret: wartime data is "dirty data." [Ref. 2:p. 293]
Hatzopoulos * s model appears to be a reasonable one.
However, as Hatzopoulos points out, it must be validated
before its usefulness can be judged [Ref. 4:p. 84]. He
proposes two ways his model might be validated:
• Perform an extensive sensitivity analysis on the model to
determine how sensitive the outcomes predicted by the
model are to the model parameters.
• Analyze the data from a small number of existing
historical missile or pulse naval battles using the model.
The validity of the model will be assessed and a better
sense of appropriate values for some of the model
parameters obtained.
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E. THESIS GOAL AND SCOPE
The goal of this thesis is to initiate the validation of
Hatzopoulos ' s Modern Naval Combat Model by carrying out an
extensive sensitivity analysis. This validation has been
accomplished in two steps.
First, the model was used to analyze the hypothetical data
from several missile and pulse weapon naval battles. Model
results were then examined from the standpoint of
"reasonableness .
"
Second, sensitivity analyses were carried out to determine
how sensitive the model's output is to changes in the inputs
for various model parameters. The term sensitivity , as noted
by Giordano and Weir, refers to the degree of change in a
model's conclusions as some condition upon which they depend
is varied; the greater the change, the more sensitive is the
model to that condition [Ref. l:p. 40].
Chapter II summarizes Hatzopoulos ' s Modern Naval Combat
Model and its origins. The major eguations and submodels are
described to provide clear understanding of how they are to be
interpreted and how they interact.
Chapter III describes a measure of combat effectiveness
developed by Barr, Weir, and Hoffman, as described in their
paper, "Evaluation of Combat ." They refer to their measure as
the "battle trace ." and it is based on the Lanchester family
of models.
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Chapter IV reports tests done to determine how sensitive
Hatzopoulos 1 Modern Naval Combat Model is to changes in input
parameters (scouting effectiveness and troop alertness)
.
Conclusions and results are provided in Chapter V.
The scope of this study is limited as noted above. Other
possible validation technigues based on exercise results are
not used. Historical data drawn from real combat would
undoubtedly be the most powerful information for validating a
battle model.
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II. MODERN NAVAL COMBAT MODEL: DESCRIPTION AND
IMPLEMENTATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes and discusses the Modern Naval
Combat Model developed by Hatzopoulos. The model represents
missile combat between ships, using typical surface-to-surface
antiship missiles [Ref. 4]. The model also includes the
effects of certain human factors issues such as scouting
effectiveness, training, morale, and leadership. The material
in this section is a summary extraction of the work due to Lt.
Epaminondas Hatzopoulos [Ref. 4].
B. MODEL DESCRIPTION
1. Definitions
• Firepower kill : A platform has suffered a firepower kill
if its combat power diminishes to zero, so it cannot
contribute combat power to its force.
• 1000 - pound bomb equivalent (TPBE) : TPBE is egual to the
explosive power of 660 pounds of TNT and is a unit of
destruction (that is, the explosive power of a 1000-pound
bomb in World War II) . The explosive power of all weapons
is expressed in multiples of TPBE.
14
• Staying power (SP) : The staying power of a platform is
the number of TPBE hits necessary to inflict a firepower
kill on the platform.
• Weapon effectiveness (PC) ; Weapon effectiveness is the
probability that a single shell fired from a group's main
battery gun will strike the target.
• Theoretical combat power (P) ; The theoretical combat
power of a given weapon type is the number of TPBEs per
minute which a platform can fire in a single salvo.
• Effective combat power (E) ; Effective combat power is the
number of TPBEs per minute fired from a group's main
battery guns which strike their targets.
• Indices
j = Platform of the Blue force,
j
'
= Platform of the Red force,
k = Group of platforms constituting the Blue force,
k' = Group of platforms constituting the Red force,
b = Blue force,
r = Red force.
2. Computation of Individual Platform Values
a. Staying power . The staying power (SP) is the
number of TPBE hits a platform can absorb before suffering a
firepower kill. Staying power values used for Beall's model
are drawn from World Wars I and II. Newer data values are not
generally available, especially for missiles. Thus
Hatzopoulos uses Beall's formula for his approximation and
15
the nominal missile used for this model is assumed to have a
destructive value of one TPBE. The staying power of platform
j in group k for the Blue force is given by the following
formula:
SPjkb = 0.070 x (full load displacement) 1 ' 3 . (2.1)
b. Theoretical combat power . The theoretical combat
power (P) is the number of missiles that can be fired from a
unit in a single salvo. The theoretical combat power of unit
j in group k for the Blue force against Red force is given by
the following formula:
Pjkb = Mjkb xWw (2.2)
where : Mjkb = Theoretical number of a standard or nominal
missiles that a unit j in group k in the Blue
force can fire in a single salvo.
Wm = A multiplicative factor to be used for missiles
all based on approximately the same technology,




If one side uses a missile with twice as much
explosive material as the nominal missile, then Wm is 2.0, so
that side has double the theoretical combat power. The
multiplier Wm can be ignored if both sides use a missile
roughly equivalent to the nominal one-TPBE missile.
c. Effective combat power . The effective combat power
(E) or combat effectiveness is the number of missiles that hit
their target per salvo. The effective combat power of
platform j ' in group k 1 of the Red force is given by:
Ej'k'x = Mj'k'b x ww x PRj'k'i (2.3)
where : PRj/k fz = The probability that a missile fired from
unit j 1 in group k' of the Red force hits its
target.
The value of PR can be calculated as follows:




where : H = Firing accuracy, given for each type of
missile. For the same type of missile, H is
the same for all units in the force.
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Njkb = Number of missiles which the j platform in k
group of the Blue forces can shoot down per
salvo (the best that can be done)
.
Substituting Equation (2.4) in Equation (2.3), the
effective combat power (E) of platform j' of group k 1 of the




Mj'k'r >< K >< H) ~ (Njkb * *m X *) ( 2 ' 5 >
Frequently the defender can determine which missiles
are threats in modern naval missile combat. Then only the
ones that will strike the defender are targeted to be shot
down. In this case, which closely corresponds to the use of
point-defense weapons, the attacker's firing accuracy H does
not apply to the second term on the righthand side of Equation
(2.5). The following modified equation is therefore used in
the model, as closely satisfying the combat circumstance under
study:
Sf'Jt'r = (Mj'k'r X K X H) ~ (Xjkb X Wa) . (2.6)
Equation (2.6) represents the effective combat power
(E) of a single Red platform firing against a single defended
Blue platform. This power is measured in hits inflicted on
the Blue platform. Hatzopoulos notes that it also would be
18
convenient to define the effective combat power of the
attacking force in terms of the destroyed staying power of the
defending platform. This is done by dividing Eguation (2.6)
by the staying power (SP) of defending (Blue) platform. The
resulting fraction of the staying power destroyed is referred
to as LOSS. If Red is attacking and Blue defending, the
fraction of destroyed staying power of platform j in group k
of the Blue force is as follows:
LOSSjkb
-^- x[(MiVr x H) - Njkb] (2.7)
Ej'k'i
SPjkb
The value of LOSSjkb must be between 0.0 and 1.0. If
the value of LOSS is a negative number (the Blue platform can
shoot down more missiles than the Red platform can fire in one
salvo) and we set the Blue LOSSjkb equal to zero. When
LOSSjkb has a value greater than 1.0, this means that the Red
platform fired more missiles than needed to destroy completely
all of the Blue platform's staying power.
19
3 - Incorporation of Human Factors
a. Scouting and Alertness
As noted before, Hatzopoulos incorporates several
human factors into his model. He defines o to be the
scouting function, representing the degree to which a force is
able to gather useful information about the enemy. The
function o has values between 0.0 and 1.0 and is applied to
the attacking force. For the defending force , a functionx
is defined as the level of alertness, with values again
ranging between 0.0 and 1.0. When these functions are
included in Eguation (2.7), it becomes:
L0SSj kt = -^r~ * (°, x Mj'k'r x H - x b x Njkb) (2.8)
where : o
r
= Scouting function of the attacking Red force.
x b = Alertness modifier for the defending Blue
force.
20




=1.0; the attacking force is fully informed of its
opponent's posture.
xb = 1.0; the defending force is fully alert.




=0.0; the attacking force has no information about
the enemy.
Therefore, there are no hits and the LOSSjkb is negative,




= 1.0; the attacking Red force is fully informed
of its opponent's posture and ambushes the Blue
force through the use of effective scouting.
x b = 0.0; the defending Blue force has no information
about the enemy, so the Blue force's level of
alertness is zero.
21
In this case Equation (2.8) becomes:
L0SSnt =
-^r~ x (°r x Mjfk ,b x H) . (2.9)
b. Training, Morale, and Leadership
Hatzopoulos uses a multiplicative degrader m to
introduce effects of training, morale, and leadership into the
model. The factor m has values between 0.0 and 1.0, and is
applied to the ability of the attacker to fire his missiles.
Similarly, a factor n (again with value between 0.0 and 1.0)
represents the ability of the defender to shoot down missiles,
as this ability is influenced by training, morale, and
leadership. When these further refinements are included,
Equation (2.7) becomes:
LOSSjkb = —*- x [(o xxMjtk ,rxmj/k ,rxH) - (Tb*Njkbxnjkb )] . (2.10)
22
Hatzopoulos now computes the remaining staying
power (SP) and theoretical combat power (P) of platform j in
group k for the Blue force at the end of time step t. This is
done using LOSSjkb as defined in Equation 2.10, yielding the
results
:
' SPjkb ( t-1 ) x (1 -LOSSjkb ( t ) ) Vj under attack





Pjkb (t-l) x (l-LOSSjkb (t) ) Vj under attack
Pjkb (t-l) otherwise .
(2.12)
When a unit suffers a hit, its ability to shoot
down missiles (N) at time step t is reduced. The value of
N(t) is updated as follows:






4 . Aggregation of Units into Groups
The terms "group" refers to subdivision of a force and
may consist of several units. Hatzopoulos next considers a
group firing as a single unit. In his model the aggregate
staying power (SP) of several platforms comprising group k of
the attacking Red force is given by:
SPkb = Y, SPJkb- (2.14)
jek
The aggregate fractional loss of group k of the
defending Blue force is given by:
o
r
xHxWm x ]T Mj/k/l xmj/k/l -^b xWm xY^Njkb xnjkb
LOSSjkb =
j' can be used J
_ (2.15)
SPkb
When SPj&it-l) is the staying power of group k of the
Blue force at the end of time step (t-1) , the aggregate
staying power (SP) of all Blue groups under attack is given
by:
SP*b <t) = X) SPx* (t_1) (2-16)
k being attacked
24
The aggregate theoretical combat power (P) of the
attacking Red group is given by:
Pk 'r (t) = £ iV r (t-D
k' is filing
(2.17)
The aggregate remaining staying power (SP) and
theoretical combat power (P) are computed from the previous
time step as follows:
SP^At-1) x (1-LOSS^it) ) \/k under attackkb 'kb
SPkh it) =




Pi.h (t-1) x (1-LOSS^it) ) Vic under attack'kb
Pw,(t-1) otherwise
(2.19)
At the end of each discrete time step t we calculate
the value of the unit's ability to shoot down missiles (N) as
follows
:







Finally, Hatzopoulos s model is used to compute the
remaining total values for each force at every discrete time
step t. The resulting values represent the aggregate
remaining staying power (SP) and theoretical combat power (P) .
These final results are used to determine the outcome of this
naval combat, and are given by the following formulas:
SPb (t) = £flPtt (t) , ( 2.21)
k
Pb it) = Y, P**> {t) • (2.22)
When an exchange of salvos occurs, Red against Blue and






identical to Equations (2.21) and (2.22), derived by
everywhere interchanging b and r.
C. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
The Hatzopoulos Modern Naval Combat Model is implemented
as a computer program coded in Fortran 77. Input parameters
are provided by the user. Several assumptions are implicit in
the model, as implemented in this thesis.
• Both forces have and use the same type of missiles.
• Each force consists of only one group.
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• Each force receives one pulse (missile hit) during each
discrete time step t. Both forces can fire simultaneously
or one force can return fire after it has received its
opponent's pulse.
The program computes and provides four kinds of outputs.
• Determination of whether the group on each side is hit by
one pulse or not at all during each time step.
• The fractional losses of a particular group if it is hit,
which determines the remaining staying power and new
offensive and defensive theoretical combat power values.
• Total losses, remaining staying power, and theoretical
combat power for both forces at the end of each discrete
time step t.
• Cumulative remaining staying power and theoretical combat
power for each force at the end of each time step, based
on calculated values from the previous time step.
27
III. THE BATTLE TRACE MODEL
It is difficult to determine the effects of changes in
weapons and tactics during a battle. This is due to
variations in the battles themselves, which result in unstable
measures of effectiveness. To overcome this problem, Barr,
Weir, and Hoffman propose what they refer to as the "battle
trace " as a dynamic measure of combat effectiveness. That is,
the battle trace measures ongoing battle results, evaluated as
a function of time into the battle [Ref. 9]. This section
describes the battle trace and briefly explains how it is
derived.
A. LANCHESTER SQUARE-LAW MODEL
Lanchester models are analytical models of battles in
which the casualty process is envisioned as a continuous
erosion of force levels on each side, due to fires from the
opposing side [Ref. 9:p. 5]. Lanchester examined two general
cases of combat, aimed fire and area fire [Ref. 10]. Aimed
fire, used by Barr, Weir, and Hoffman in their model, assumes
that individual targets are identified and attacked by any
number of opposing systems.
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Lanchester hypothesized that combat between two
homogeneous forces under the conditions of modern warfare
could be modelled by a system of first order differential





= - ay , where a > , and x ( ) = xndt
and (3.1)
—
f£ = - bx, where b > , and y ( ) = y .
In the Lanchester system, X and Y refer to the two forces,
and x(t) and y(t) to the strengths of these forces at time t.
The positive constants a and b in Equations (3.1) are called
the attrition rate coefficients.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATTLE TRACE MODEL
For development of the battle trace model, several
assumptions are made concerning force strengths [Ref.9:p. 9].
• The strength of a force is simply the number of combatants
in operation at time t, for both forces.
• The functions x(t) and y(t) can take on real values
(rather than simply non-negative integer values)
.
• The functions x(t) and y(t) are both continuously
differentiable functions of t.
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Separating the variables in equation (3.2) we have:
ay dy = bx dx
.
(3.3)
Equation (3.3) can be integrated from time to time t.
That is,
t t
afy dy = bfx dx
.
(3.4)
This yields the result
a(y 2t - y 2 ) = b(x 2t - x 2 ) . (3.5)
in which y > y t and xQ > x t .
Letting c = ay* - bxl we have the solution,
ay 2 - bx 2 = c, (3.6)
where y = y t and x = x t depend on the time t > .
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The trajectories for c*0 are hyperbolas. When c = 0, the
trajectory is the straight line y =
N
x. When c > 0, the
trajectory intersects the y-axis at y =
N
—
. At that point
a
the Y force wins because the X force has been totally
eliminated. On the other hand, if c < 0, the X force wins
with a final strength level of x =
N "3
Based on the above analysis, the necessary and sufficient
condition for a force to win can be stated as:





Y wins if x < Vo\
a.
b
The original Lanchester square-law equations (3.1) can be
differentiated and the terms rearranged to obtain the second-
order differential equation




Solving this equation using standard methods in
differential equation yields:
y ( t ) = y cosYi/ab t - xi
°\
— sirih/ah tb
Thus it can be shown that:
ili^l- = coshv^B t - ^y y n
— sinhv/a5 t (3.8)












and a time parameter
T = Jab t (3.10)
The constant y/ab represents the intensity of the battle
and controls how quickly the battle is driven to conclusion.
That is, the larger the value of Jab~ the shorter is the
length of the battle. The ratio — represents the relativeb
32
effectiveness of the individual combatants on the two opposing
sides [Ref . 9:p. 14 ]
.
If the battle is occurring in discrete time steps, then at
each time step t the fraction (^
—
r\ can be compared to the
\ x( t) /
ratio — . This results in the following equation:
a
f(i)- R - <»">
bx 2This observation suggests comparing against 1.
ay 2
• If the ratio R is less than 1, the Y force is winning.
• If the ratio R is greater than 1, the X force is winning.
• If the ratio R is equal to 1, then there is a draw.
Since we do not generally know the values of a and b, it





(- bx) X dt X
.
Ay X v
ay 2 (- ay) y dx
'




In Equation (3.12), Ay and Ax represent Y's and X's
losses, respectively, during a time interval of At. The
result of Equation (3.12) can be combined with (3.11) to give:
Ay
R = —¥— (3.13)Ax
The value R is called the Fractional Exchange Ratio .
In summary:
• If R < 1, the Y force is winning.
• If R > 1, the X force is winning.
• If R = 1, the battle is stalemated.
C. USE OF THE BATTLE TRACE MODEL
Barr, Weir, and Hoffman refer to the plot of R versus time
t over the course of a given battle as the battle trace of the
battle [Ref. 9:p. 18]. That is, for a battle with duration of
1 hour, the ratio R can be computed at, say, every At = 5
minutes, based on force attrition rates. The resulting plot
dynamically shows the time regions where X is winning and
those where Y is winning without specific knowledge of
coefficients a and b, or assumptions that they are constants
in time. Thus, instead of a single battle outcome it is
possible to trace the ebb and flow of battle progress.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF MODERN NAVAL COMBAT MODEL
The primary goal of this study is to determine how
sensitive the Hatzopoulos Modern Naval Combat Model is to
changes in input parameters. Of particular interest is the
sensitivity of the model to two human-related factors:
scouting effectiveness and troop alertness. The general
approach taken here is to analyze the sensitivity through the
use of ratios. Two ratios are developed for this purpose.
The first is a ratio of one force's remaining staying
power to that of the other force, following each salvo. The
second is a fractional exchange ratio . This fractional
exchange ratio represents the proportion of each force that
has been lost after an exchange of missiles. These two ratios
are discussed below, along with the results of their use in
determining model sensitivity to the factors of interest.
35
A. RATIO OF REMAINING STAYING POWER
1. Development of Ratio
Following each salvo both forces have a remaining
staying power (see Equation 2.18) which can be calculated
using the following equation:
SPZ ( t ) = SPr ( t-1 ) x (1 - LOSSr ( t ) ) . (4.1)
Where : SP
r
(t) = Remaining staying power of the Red force
after time step t (which is equivalent to





(t) = Percentage loss of the Red force at the end
of time step t.










This represents the relative loss of the Red force
during the time step t-1 to t. Similarly, the relative loss








The ratio RR(t) of the Red force loss to that of the
Blue force can now be defined. The resulting ratio RR(t) of
remaining staying power is equivalent to the ratio used in the




(t) - SPZ ( t - 1
)
. , LOSS. (t) SPZ t -
1
, M A xRR( t) = Z— r- = ; -^ ; . (4.4)
LOSSb (t) SPb ( t ) - SPb ( t - 1 )
SPb ( t - 1 )
Therefore, the following conclusions can be reached
for the Hatzopoulos salvo model:
• If RR < 1, the Red force is winning.
• If RR > 1, the Blue force is winning.
• If RR = 1, the battle is a stalemate.
As may be observed, these are the same results as for the
Battle Trace model in Equation (3.13).
2 . Computer Implementation
The original Hatzopoulos computer program was modified
to calculate the ratio RR(t), as shown in Equation (4.4), at
each discrete time step t (see Appendix A) . The program
generates a plot of the remaining staying power ratio for each
discrete time step t. Points on the line representing the
ratio value 1.0 indicate time increments when both forces have
the same remaining staying power and are stalemated
(temporarily). Points below 1.0 represent times when the Red
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force is winning; points above 1.0 indicate when the Blue
force is winning.
3. Testing Model Sensitivity to Scouting Effectiveness
and Alertness
This program has been used to test the sensitivity of
the Hatzopoulos model to the human factors of alertness and
scouting. For the scenario used for these tests, both forces
consist of the same number of fast frigates (FFs) . All ships
have exactly the same specifications and carry the same type
of missiles. Values used for both forces in the sensitivity
tests are presented in Table II. As may be observed, all of
the constant model parameters are exactly the same for both




TABLE II. CHARACTERISTICS OF RED AND BLUE SHIPS
Factor Blue Force Red Force
Number of Ships


















Break Point 0.30 0.30
Probability of
Hit (H) 0.80 0.80
This scenario is used to test the sensitivity of the
Hatzopoulos model to changes in alertness and in scouting.
This is done in a two-step process. In the first, scouting
effectiveness values are held constant, while alertness values
are varied. In the second, alertness values remain constant
while scouting effectiveness values change.
Case 1
For this case, Red force scouting effectiveness o R is
fixed at a value of 0.90. Blue force scouting effectiveness
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oB is given a fixed value of 0.85. Red force
alertness x^ sequentially was given values of 0.50, 0.70,
0.75, 0.80, 0.85, and 0.90. Blue force alertness x
fl
then was
modified in a consistent manner to determine the " critical
point" when the winner changes from one side to the other.
For the first test, the alertness of the Red force was
fixed at i R = 0.50, while Blue force alertness was varied from
xB = 0.45 to x B = 0.61 in steps of 0.01. Figure 1 provides the
results. When the alertness of the Blue force changes from
x B
=
. 56 to x B = . 57 , then the winner changes from the Red
force to the Blue force.
For this particular case, the break point for both
forces has been set at 0.20, instead of the 0.30 shown in
Table II. This was done so that the break points would not be
reached after the first salvo.
With this change, when the alertness of Blue force
moves from x B = 0.51 to xB = 0.6 both forces reach this 0.20
break point. The winner of the battle, however, changes at
0.57. Finally, at x B = 0.61 the Blue force wins with a total
loss of 0.65.
Red force alertness was next given a value of
























O Alert, Blue O.JC
^Alert. Blue C.61
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Figure 1. Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Alertness is Fixed at 0.50 While Blue Force




























Figure 2. Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Alertness is Fixed at 0.70 While Blue Force
Alertness varies from 0.65 to 0.78.
42
x B
= 0.65 to x B = 0.80 in 0.01 increments (Figure 2) . The
critical point occurs when the Blue force alertness is
x B
= 0.76 . At x B = 0.77 , the winner of the battle changes to
the Blue force.
For the remaining tests for this case, Red force
alertness was varied from x R = 0.75 to x R = 0.90 in steps of
0.05. Blue force alertness was initialized at x B = \ R - . 05 ,
and increased in increments of 0.01 until Blue force wins the
battle. This occurs at x B = x^ + 0.08. That is, at
x B = x^ + . 07 , the winner changed to Blue force for these four
tests. Results are shown in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Case 2
For this case the alertness of Red force x^ was fixed
at a value of 0.90 and Blue force alertness x B at 0.85. Red
force scouting effectiveness o R was varied systematically from
0.70, to 0.80, to 0.90. Blue force scouting effectiveness,
o B , was then varied in a consistent manner to determine when
the battle outcome changed from one winner to the other.
Red force scouting effectiveness was set initially at
oR = 0.7 while the scouting function of the Blue force was
increased from o B = 0.6 5 in increments of 0.01 (Figure 7) . At
a B = 0.74, the winner changed to the Blue force. Until the
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Figure 3 Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Alertness is Fixed at 0.75 While Blue Force











Figure 4 Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Alertness is Fixed at 0.80 While Blue Force








0.00 2,00 4.00 5.00
Time step I
Figure 5 Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Alertness is Fixed at 0.85 While Blue Force
Alertness varies from 0.80 to 0.93.
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Figure 6 Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Alertness is Fixed at 0.90 While Blue Force
Alertness varies from 0.85 to 0.98.
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scouting effectiveness of the Blue force rose to oB = 0.70,
the total loss for the Red force was zero.
Next, the scouting effectiveness of the Red force was
set at oR = 0.80. Blue force scouting effectiveness was
increased from oB = 0.75 in steps of 0.01 (Figure 8). The




Finally, Red force scouting effectiveness was given a
value of o R = 0.90 (Figure 9). Scouting effectiveness of the
Blue force was increased from a B = 0.85 in steps of 0.01. At
oB = 0.94, both forces reached their break points and the
winner changed to the Blue force.
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Figure 7 Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Scouting is Fixed at 0.70 While Blue Force
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0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Time step t
5.00 6.00
Figure 8 Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Scouting is Fixed at 0.80 While Blue Force
Scouting varies from 0.75 to 0.84.
50
B. FRACTIONAL EXCHANGE RATIO
1. Development of Ratio
Let us reconcile the terminology of Chapter II
(Hatzopoulos Model) with Chapter III (Weir, Barr, and
Hoffman) . Let the Red and Blue forces comprise R and B
identical platforms respectively. Then we have seen from
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) that the fraction of identical
platforms lost to R and B, respectively, is:
LOSSkll = A?K I r>
and
LOSSkb = M
This holds because SPk i I = y^ SP i /k > r = cc 1 R, where a.,^ is
j"
assumed to be the same for each R platform. Similarly,
SPkb = ^SPjkb = Pi-6 / when P x is assumed the same for each B
j
platform.
In the Hatzopoulos model, if we further assume that
both forces use missiles equivalent to a nominal one-TPBE
missile, then the missile technology multiplier Wm can be
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Time step t
Figure 9 Results of Hatzopoulos Model Tests when Red Force
Scouting is Fixed at 0.90 While Blue Force
Scouting varies from 0.85 to 0.94.
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ratio for each force from Equation (2.8) is:





A 5 o R xMR xmR xH-x g xNB xn 1
(4.5)
B Pi x B
(4.6)
where : a
1 , P x = Unit staying power (i.e., the number of
TPBE hits necessary to inflict a
firepower kill on a platform) of each








AB = Theoretical per-salvo "delta" losses of
forces R and B, respectively.
R
,
B = The number of units (ships) of forces
R and B, respectively.
mr i mb = Theoretical number of missiles that each
force R and B, respectively, can fire in
a single salvo.
mR ' % = Multiplicative degrader for each force
R and B, respectively, which introduces
the effects of training, morale, and
leadership.
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NR , NB = Number of missiles which each force R
and B, respectively, can shoot down per
salvo (the best that can be done)
.
nR ' nB
= Multiplicative degrader for each force
R and B, respectively, which represents
the ability of the defender to shoot
down missiles.
H = Firing accuracy, given for each type of
missile. For the same type of missile,
H is the same for all units in the
force.
Since it is now assumed that all ships on a side are
identical, additional parameters can be defined. First, we
can say that:
a 2 , P 2 = Unit salvo striking power in hits (good
shots) for each ship of the R and B forces,
respectively
.
Since all units have the same salvo striking power,
the total salvo striking power for force R is a 2 xR. Because
the MR is the theoretical number of missiles that force R can
fire in a single salvo, then MRxmR in the Hatzopoulos model
(Equation 2.10) is the total salvo striking power in hits
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(good shots) for the R force which we define as ct 2 xR.
Similarly, for the B force, total salvo striking power is
P 2 x£, which would be the same as MBxmB .
If all ships of both forces are eguivalent, we can
also say that:
a
3 , P 3 = Unit defensive power (power defense) for
each ship of the R and B forces,
respectively
.
Since each unit on a side has the same defensive
power, then the total defensive power for the R force is a 2 xR.
Because the NR is the theoretical number of missiles which
the force R can shoot down per salvo (the best that can be
done), the term NRxnR in Equation (2.10) of the Hatzopoulos
Model is the total defensive power for the R force which we
define as a 3 xR. Similarly, for the B force, total defensive
power is P 3 xB, which is the same as NBxnB .
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Using these assumptions and definitions, the
fractional exchange ratio for each force can be expressed as:









The fractional exchange ratio (FER) between the two
forces is written as:
AR
FER = —£- . (4.9)AB '
B
Equation (4.9) combined with Equations (4.7) and (4.8)
gives:
AR





-l ^ -2 x -^-i .(4.10)AB aR x a 2 x R x H - zB x p 3 x B a 1 x R
B
Equation (4.10) is simplified first by expressing the
number of ships in the R force as a function of the number of
ships in the B force. That is, using a multiplier k, the
56
number of ships in the R force is given by R = kxB , where k
is a real number greater than zero. Second, if it is assumed
that the unit staying power for all ships in both forces is
exactly the same, then a
x
= P 1 . Then the fractional exchange
ratio (FER) can be expressed as:
1 a R x B, x H - t p x a, x kFER = 4 x — — r5 " ?r- • (4.11)k a R x a 2 x H x k - x B x p 3
Since the two factors, scouting effectiveness o and
alertness x
,
are of especial interest, it is important to
consider how FER changes as these factors change. Calculating
the partial derivatives of FER with respect to the variables
°r' °B' x r> anc^ T B' ' we have:
d(FER) 1 ~a 2 x H x k x (a B x ft 2 x H - x R x oc 3 k)





- « 3 x k










Jc Ojj x a 2 x if x Jc - : fi x P 3
'
d(FER) 1 v P 3 x (o B x P 2 x H - t^ x a 3 x Jc)
«\
_ T x o • 14 « ID J
ox s ic (o R x cc 2 x H x k - xB x p 3 )
2
The relative sensitivity of Hatzopoulos ' s model to
changes in scouting effectiveness, when compared to changes in
alertness, can also be examined through consideration of






« 2 x ff x (oB x p 2 x ff - t, x tt 3 x J:)
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P 2 x //(o^ x a 2 x // x ^ - t b x P 3 ) i7P2 d(FER) P 3 x (o B x P 2 x H - T R x a 3 x k)
B
When the ratio p 1 is greater than 1.0 then changes to
the model's parameters for force R are more sensitive to
aR than to t R . When the value of the ratio is less than 1.0,




A computer program was coded in Fortran 77 to examine
the ratios p 1 and p 2 for all possible values of o R , x R , cB ,
and tb from 0.60 to 0.95 in increments of 0.05 (Appendix B)
.
The program gives an output table with a value of 1.0 at each
point where the ratio is more sensitive to scouting than to
alertness. Examples of the use of this program and its output
follow.
3. Testing Model Sensitivity to Scouting Effectiveness
and Alertness
The program (Appendix B) was developed to calculate
the ratios p.,^ and p 2 shown in Equations (4.16) and (4.17),
respectively. A single scenario is used to examine where the
model is more sensitive to scouting effectiveness, o R and oB ,
than to alertness, xR and t b , respectively.
For the scenario used for these tests both forces are
assumed to have the same unit striking power, a
x
and P x , for
each ship of the two forces, R and B, respectively. The exact
number of ships of each individual force does not affect the
outcome. However, the multiplier k in Equation (4.11) does
need to be included.
Model sensitivity is tested for two situations. In
the first situation, the unit salvo striking power, oc 2 and P 2 ,
and the unit defensive power, a 3 and P 3 , for each ship of both
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forces are taken to be exactly equal. In the second
situation, the unit salvo striking power for the B force is
greater than for R; that is, P 2 > a 2 . The unit defensive power
for the B force is also greater than for the R force; that is,
P 3 > <x 3 .
Program output consists of a series of tables
(Appendices C and D) . Each table has exactly 64 cells. Each
cell describes the scouting effectiveness and alertness of
either force R or force B when the scouting effectiveness and
alertness for the opposing force, B or R, is varied from 0.60
to 0.95 in increments of 0.05. The columns in each cell
represent alertness and the rows represent scouting
effectiveness, making up a matrix with a maximum of 64 values.
In each of the 64 cells, the program places a value of
1.0 in the matrix wherever the model is more sensitive to
scouting effectiveness, 0, than to alertness x. No value is
shown in the matrix when the model is more sensitive to
alertness t than to scouting effectiveness o . Although 64
cells are possible (due to the number of conditions
considered) not all of the tables include that many cells.
When the matrix has no values of 1.0 at all, these cells are
simply omitted. They represent the cases where the model is
sensitive only to alertness x and not sensitive to scouting
effectiveness o at all.
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Case 1
The Hatzopoulos model is tested first for the
situation where both forces have the same unit salvo striking
power (that is, a 2 = P 2 = 3 ) and the same unit defensive power
( oc 3
= P 3 = 2 ) . Three major conditions are considered. In the
first condition, the R force is only 0.75 the numerical
strength, here often the numerical strength is simply called
the "strength," of the B force (that is, if the B force has
four ships, then the R force has only three). In the second
condition, the strengths of the R and B forces are egual. In
the third condition, the R force strength is 1.50 times that
of the B force (that is, if the B force has four ships, the R
force has six)
.
The program produces two tables for each of these
three relative force strength conditions for each situation.
Thus a total of six tables is produced during analysis of
model sensitivity to the Case 1 situation (Appendix C) . For
each force strength condition (for example, R = 0.75B), the
first table includes up to 64 cells, each with a matrix of
sensitivity values (either 1.0 or none) that results from
holding B force alertness tb and scouting effectivenessa B
constant at given values (for example, a B = 0.60 and
tb = 0.60) while varying these two factors for the R force
(for example, from 0.60 to 0.95). The second table produces
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a similar result for holding R force x R and o R values constant
while varying B force alertness and scouting effectiveness.
Let us now examine each table. In the first condition
the R force is 0.75 of the strength of the B force, and the
table (Appendix C, Table la) , shows that the majority of cells
contain no 1.0 values. This means that, under most of the
conditions considered, the model is more sensitive to Red
force alertness than to its scouting effectiveness. As both
the scouting effectiveness and alertness of the Red force
increase, conditions are tested when the model becomes more
sensitive to scouting effectiveness than to the alertness of
the Red force.
In the second table (Appendix C, Table lb) , assuming
the same force condition, the opposite situation is observed.
Most cells contain many 1.0 values in their matrices. This
indicates that, for most of the conditions considered, the
model is more sensitive to scouting effectiveness than to the
alertness of the Blue force. As the alertness of the Blue
force increases the model demonstrates more sensitivity to
Blue force alertness than to its scouting effectiveness.
In the next two tables we assume, the strengths of
both forces are equal. Observe that both tables (Appendix C,
Table Ila and Table lib) are exactly the same. As the
scouting effectiveness and alertness of both forces increase,
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the model becomes increasingly more sensitive to scouting
effectiveness than to alertness of the two forces.
The third condition is where the strength of Red force
is 1.50 times that of the Blue force. The first table for
this condition (Appendix C, Table Ilia) contains only seven
cells in which the matrix includes at least one 1.0, only
occurring at very high values of scouting effectiveness and
alertness for the Red force. This indicates that the model is
more sensitive to Red force scouting effectiveness than to its
alertness. The second table (Appendix C, Table Illb)
demonstrates that as the scouting effectiveness of Red force
increases, then the model is more sensitive to the alertness
than to the scouting effectiveness of Blue force.
Case 2
Next the Hatzopoulos model was tested for the situation
where the unit salvo striking power of force B is greater than
that of R force (that is, P 2 =4 > a 2 =3) and B's unit defensive
power is also greater (that is, P 3 =3 > oc 3 =2). Three major
conditions are considered. In the first condition, the
strengths of both forces are equal. In the second condition,
the R force numerical strength is 1.50 times that of the B
force (that is, if the B force has four ships, the R force
has six) . In the third condition, the R force strength is
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two times that of the B force (that is, if the B force has
three ships, the R force has six)
.
The program produces two tables for each of these three
relative force strength conditions. Thus a total of six
tables is produced during analysis of model sensitivity to the
Case 2 situation (Appendix D) . For each force strength
condition (for example, R = 1.50B), the first table includes
up to 64 cells, each with a matrix of sensitivity values
(either 1.0 or none) that results from holding B force
alertness x B and scouting effectiveness o B constant at given
values (for example, oB = 0.60 and xB=0.60) while varying
these same two factors for the R force (for example, from 0.60
to 0.95). The second table produces a similar result for
holding R force z R and o R values constant while varying B
force alertness and scouting effectiveness.
In the first condition (the strengths of both forces
are egual) , only cells representing the situation where the
scouting effectiveness of the Red force is greater than 0.80
and its alertness is greater than 0.75 does the matrix contain
at least one 1.0 (Appendix D, Table la). In all other cases
the model is more sensitive to the alertness than to the
scouting effectiveness of the Red force. In the second table
(Appendix D, Table lb) , as scouting effectiveness increases,
the model is more sensitive to Blue force alertness than to
its scouting effectiveness. On the other hand, as the
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alertness of the Blue force increases, the model becomes more
sensitive to Blue force scouting effectiveness than to its
alertness in the situations where the alertness and scouting
effectiveness of the Red force is very high.
The second condition represents the situation where
the strength of the Red force is 1.50 times that of the Blue
force. As may be seen in the first table (Appendix D, Table
Ila) , as the scouting effectiveness and the alertness of the
Red force increases, the model becomes more sensitive to the
scouting effectiveness than to the alertness of the Red force.
In the second table (Appendix D, Table lib) , it becomes
obvious that, as the scouting effectiveness of the Blue force
increases, the model becomes more sensitive to the scouting
effectiveness than to the alertness of the Blue force, when
the alertness of Blue force is fixed. Otherwise, when both
the scouting effectiveness and the alertness of Blue force
increase, the model becomes more sensitive to Blue force
alertness than to its scouting effectiveness.
In the third condition, the strength of Red force is
twice that of the Blue force. The first table (Appendix D,
Table Ilia) indicates that, as the alertness of the Red force
increases while holding its scouting effectiveness fixed, the
model becomes more sensitive to Red force alertness than to
its scouting effectiveness. As the scouting effectiveness of
the Red force increases, the model becomes more sensitive to
the scouting effectiveness of the Red force. This is true
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especially for the cases where both the alertness and scouting
effectiveness of the Blue force are very high. Inspection of
the second table (Appendix D, Table Illb) indicates that the
model is generally more sensitive to its alertness than to the
scouting effectiveness of the Blue force. The exceptions are
those cells representing the situation where the alertness and
scouting effectiveness of the Blue force are both very high
(at least 0.75 and 0.80, respectively).
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this analysis was to determine how sensitive
the Hatzopoulos Modern Naval Combat Model is to changes in
scouting effectiveness and alertness. The general approach
taken was to analyze model sensitivity through the use of two
ratios developed for this purpose.
Several conclusions based on the analyses are provided
below, to show the utility and power of the model once a real
tactical situation is known. However, it should be emphasized
that these conclusions cannot be generalized to all
situations. The model includes six keys variables on each
side. These 12 variables, all interactive, take values that
depend on the characteristics and relative strengths of the
two opposing forces. Although the values for the other
variables are representative, only scouting effectiveness and
alertness have been examined in this study.
1. Ratio of Remaining Staying Power
The first measure introduced is the ratio of one
force's remaining staying power to that of the other force,
following each salvo. For this study both forces are assumed
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to consist of the same number of units with the same platform
characteristics. The sensitivity of this ratio is tested with
the Hatzopoulos Model in two cases.
In the first case, scouting effectiveness values of
both forces are fixed, while alertness values are varied. Red
force scouting effectiveness o R is fixed at a value of 0.90.
Blue force scouting effectiveness o B is given a lower fixed
value of 0.85. Red force alertness x R is sequentially given
values of 0.50, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, and 0.90. Blue force
alertness \ B then is varied in a consistent manner to
determine the "critical point" when the winner changes from
the Red force to the Blue force according to the criterion of
remaining staying power.
In this process the Blue force alertness is
initialized at x B = x R - 0.05, and increased in increments of
0.01 until the Blue force wins the battle. This consistently
occurred at x B = xR + . 07 .
In the second case, alertness values of both forces
are held fixed, while scouting effectiveness values are
varied. For this case the alertness of Red force x R is fixed
at a value of 0.90 and the Blue force alertness x B at 0.85.
Red force scouting effectiveness aR is then varied
systematically from 0.70, to 0.80, to 0.90. Blue force
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alertness z B is then modified to determine when the battle
outcome changes the winner from the Red force to Blue force.
In this case the Blue force scouting effectiveness is
set initially at c B = o R - . 05 , and increased in increments of
0.01 until the Blue force wins. This consistently occurred at
o B = aR + .04 .
2 . Fractional Exchange Ratio
The second ratio explored is the fractional exchange
ratio , which compares the proportion of each force that no
longer can fight effectively after an exchange of missiles.
By means of the application of partial derivatives, this ratio
was tested to see when the model is more sensitive to scouting
effectiveness o than to alertness x in two situations.
a. Situation Where Both Forces are Equal
In the first situation, both forces have the same




= P 3 ). Three major variations are examined, which
can be summarized as shown in Table III.
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TABLE III. MODEL SENSITIVITY WHEN STRIKING AND
DEFENSIVE POWER ARE EQUAL
(P 2 = a 2' P 3 = «3 )
















x R ( if x R ] ) *B
In the first variation, the Red force size is only
0.75 that of the Blue force. The model was found to be more
sensitive to the Red force alertness x R than to its scouting
effectiveness o R , but more sensitive to the Blue force
scouting effectiveness o B than to its alertness x B .
The model results in this variation are expected
because the larger force can have higher scouting
effectiveness and then increase its alertness to be ready for
a battle. For example, assume the Blue force has eight ships
and the Red force has six ships in an area. From the point of
view of the Blue force, because the force is bigger, it makes
sense that the alertness level for each ship can be less and
yet the total defensive force of Blue's ships is still able to
strike down the enemy missiles. Yet if the Blue force is
70
going to win, it needs to strike out against the ships in the
Red force, so Blue needs to know Red positions, and strike
strongly. That is, the scouting effectiveness increase has a
greater payoff for the Blue force than will an alertness
increase.
On the other hand, the smaller Red force must
concentrate on alertness. In our example, because Red is
smaller, it must improve the alertness level for each ship
first. The payoff in survivability is greater than the payoff
from a better offensive strike.
In the second variation, the total strengths of the
Red and Blue forces are equal. The model showed that, as the
scouting effectiveness o and alertness t of both forces
increase, the results become increasingly more sensitive to
the scouting effectiveness o rather than to the alertness
X of the two forces.
Based on this variation, we can conclude the
following from the model results. When scouting effectiveness
and alertness are low, we observe weak offensive and defensive
power on both sides. In these particular circumstance it is
more advantageous to strengthen the defense by greater
alertness, because a stronger defense contributes more to
deflect the enemy's (relatively weak) offense than an
offensive power increase (bigger scouting effectiveness)
contributes to getting through the enemy's defense. As
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scouting effectiveness and alertness increase, defensive
firepower cannot match the offensive improvement, which will
"saturate" the defense. Therefore, when scouting
effectiveness and alertness both are high, a more advantageous
ratio of remaining staying power results from continued
improvement of scouting effectiveness, although losses to both
sides will be severe.
In the third variation, the Red force strength is
1.50 times that of the Blue force. The model now is found
initially to be more sensitive to the Red force alertness
z R than to its scouting effectiveness o R . However, as the
alertness of the Red force z R increases, the model becomes
more sensitive to Red force alertness z R than to its scouting
effectiveness o R . On the other hand the model begins and
remains more sensitive to the alertness x B of the weaker
Blue force than to its scouting effectiveness aB .
In this variation, the situation is approximately
the opposite of the first variation. For example, assume the
Blue force has six ships and the Red force has nine ships in
an area. From the point of view of the Red force, because the
force is bigger the alertness level for each ship can be less
and yet total defensive force of Red's ships will still strike
down most or all enemy missiles. But the Red force total
alertness must first be made high enough to defeat Blue's
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strike. Only after that can the Red force give priority to
strike out against the Blue force. Yet if the Red force is
going to win Red needs to know Blue positions, and strike
strongly. That is, the scouting effectiveness increase for
Blue pays off more than will an alertness increase, but only
after alertness is made high enough to defend the Blue force.
On the other hand, the smaller Blue force must
concentrate on alertness. In our example, from the point of
view of Red force, because the force is smaller, it makes
sense to improve the alertness level for each ship. The
payoff in survivability is greater than the payoff in a better
offensive strike.
b. Situation in Which Each Blue Unit is Stronger
In the second situation, the unit salvo striking
power of the Blue force is assumed to be greater than that of
the Red force (
P
2 > a 2 ) and the unit defensive power of the
Blue force is also assumed to be greater ( P 3 > <x 3 ). Three
major variations were examined which can be summarized as
shown in Table IV.
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TABLE IV. MODEL SENSITIVITY WHEN STRIKING AND DEFENSIVE
POWER OF BLUE UNITS ARE GREATER THAN RED UNITS
(P 2 > cc 2 , P 3 > CC 3 )
Variation Red Force Factor
for which Model is
Most Sensitive
Blue Force Factor













o B if oB and x B
are high;






o R if a B is high
and z R is low
*B
NOTE: In situations not explained, the pattern is too complex
to reduce to table form.
In the first variation, the numerical strengths of
both forces are equal, but the Blue force has greater unit
striking and defensive power and therefore Blue combat power
is greater overall. Results indicated that the model was
consistently more sensitive to Red alertness x R than to Red
scouting effectiveness aR . Blue also was usually better of
the improve alertness xB . But as scouting effectiveness o of
both forces increased, the model results became more
sensitive to the Blue force scouting effectiveness c B than
alertness xB .
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The weaker Red force should give first priority to
alertness in nearly all circumstance. In our example a higher
Red alertness level for each ship will pay off in a Force
Exchange Ratio (FER) greater than the payoff from a better
offensive strike.
In most cases Blue also improves the FER to its
best advantage by improving defenses through alertness x B .
When the enemy's scouting effectiveness o B is high, however,
Blue cannot get enough advantage from improving alertness x B ,
so is better off by increasing its offense through better
scouting effectiveness c B .
In the second variation, the Red force numerical
strength is 1.50 times that of the Blue force. As the force-
wide scouting effectiveness (Rxo R ) and the alertness (Rxt R )
of the Red force increase, the results show that the model is
nearly always more sensitive to the whole Red force's scouting
effectiveness than to Red alertness. Blue's situation is
complex. As the scouting effectiveness Bxo B of the Blue
force increases, the model becomes more sensitive to scouting
effectiveness o B than to the alertness \ B of the smaller but
individually more capable Blue force. On the other hand, when
both the baseline alertness x B and scouting effectivenesso s
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of the Blue force are low, Blue force alertness x B is more
important than scouting effectiveness o B .
In this variation Red is numerically greater than
Blue, but Blue has greater unit striking and defensive power.
For example, assume the Blue force has six ships and the Red
force has nine ships in an area. From the point of view of
Red, because his force is more numerous, the alertness level
for each ship can be less and yet total defensive force of all
Red's ships will still strike down most enemy missiles. Yet
for Red to win, it needs to strike strongly by increasing its
scouting effectiveness a R .
Blue is numerically smaller, but has greater
individual unit power. Blue's situation is complex. The
reader would be well advised to refer to Table lib and draw
his own conclusions for variation two.
In the third variation, Red's numerical strength is
twice that of Blue. As the alertness t^ of the Red force
increases, the results indicate that the model becomes more
sensitive to Red force alertness x R than to its scouting
effectiveness o R . On the other hand, the model is constantly
more sensitive to the alertness i B of the Blue force than to
scouting effectiveness o B .
In most cases Red improves its FER to its best
advantage by improving defenses through alertness x R . This,
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paradoxically, is especially so when alertness x R is already
high. But if Blue's scouting effectiveness a B is high and
Red's alertness x R is low, Red improves its FER more by an
increase in its scouting effectiveness o R . This is because
a marginal increase in its defenses cannot stop Blue's
missiles sufficiently to be worthwhile.
The smaller Blue force must concentrate on
alertness. The payoff in survivability will be greater than
the payoff from a better offensive strike.
Finally, it is worth stating again that these
conclusions are not general. They have been drawn to show the
power of the Staying Power Ratio and Force Effectiveness
Ratio, once the actual opposing forces and their
characteristics have been estimated.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The possibilities for further parametric study and
sensitivity analysis have not been exhausted in this thesis.
Our recommendations for future research are as follows:
• Perform a similar sensitivity analysis with the model when
the scouting effectiveness and alertness of both forces
vary during the battle. One case of special interest is
that in which scouting effectiveness decreases (because of
confusion after the first attack) , while alertness
increases (because the force is more vigilant after the
first attack)
.
• Extend the methodology developed in this thesis to perform
a further sensitivity analysis on the model in different
situations. An example would be to hold fixed the
scouting effectiveness and alertness of both forces while
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varying the other parameters: staying power, striking
power, and defensive power of each unit.
• Perform a similar sensitivity analysis when the two forces
are different numerically.
• Perform a similar sensitivity analysis when the two forces
do not fire simultaneously.
• Use historical or wargaming data to validate the model and
examine its sensitivity to human factors, scouting
effectiveness, and alertness.
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APPENDIX A. COMPUTER PROGRAM TO CALCULATE RR(T)
The following is a program listing of the computer
implementation of the naval combat model. It has been
modified to calculate the ratio R(t) , as described in Chapter
IV, Section A. 2. The program was coded in Fortran 77 and run






* 1. Same type of missiles for both forces (the average
* missile)
* 2. Each force is consisting of one group
* 3 . In the duration of each discrete time step we assume
* that both forces receive one pulse, either both forces
* fire simultaneously or the one force returns fire,
* after it has already received its opponent's pulse






INTEGER NB , NR , DB , DR , BUNITS , RUNITS , NPULSE ,W,I,Z,K,L,Q,S,J
REAL LOSSB(20) ,LOSSR(20) , SPB, SPR, SFB, SFR, R ( 20)
REAL TOTSPB , TOTSPR , REMSPB (20), REMSPR (20), BRPNTB , BRPNTR
REAL X(20) ,MB,MR,TLOSSB(20) ,TLOSSR(20) , AFB, AFR,UPDNB (20)
REAL UPDNR(20), NDB, NDR, H , MDB, MDR, REMPB ( 20) , REMPR ( 20)
INITIALIZATION
PRINT *, 'PLEASE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING DATA FOR BOTH 1
'OPPONENTS BE CAREFUL, THE FIRST VALUE YOU ENTER'
'TO BE FOR THE BLUE FORCE AND THE SECOND FOR THE'
•RED FORCE NUMBER OF UNITS IN EACH FORCE'
BUNITS, RUNITS
'FULL LOAD DISPLACEMENT FOR BOTH FORCES'
DB,DR
'SCOUTING FUNCTION FOR BOTH FORCES'
SFB, SFR
'ALERTNESS EFFECTIVENESS FOR BOTH FORCES'
AFB,AFR
'NUMBER OF MISSILES A UNIT CAN FIRE PER SALVO 1
'FOR BOTH FORCES (REAL)'
MB, MR
'MULTIPLICATIVE DEGRADER FOR M FOR BOTH FORCES'
MDB, MDR
'NUMBER OF MISSILES A UNIT CAN SHOT DOWN IN ONE'




































'MULTIPLICATIVE DEGRADER FOR N FOR BOTH FORCES'
NDB,NDR
'THE BREAK POINT FOR BOTH FORCES (REAL BETWEEN'
'0.0 AND 1.0, NOTE: THIS IS THE PERCENTAGE OF'
'THE INITIAL STAYING POWER BELOW WHICH THE'
'BATTLE IS CONSIDERED TERMINATED.'
'IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO ASSIGN VALUES FOR'
' BREAK POINT ENTER 0.0, 0.0'
BRPNTB,BRPNTR
'PROBABILITY OF HIT VERSUS UNDEFENDED TARGET'
H
'NUMBER OF DISCRETE TIME STEPS FOR THE PROGRAM'
'TO BE EXECUTED'
NPULSE
SPB = 0.070*( (REAL(DB) **(1. 0/3.0)
)

















REMSPR(I) = TOTS PR
REMPB(I) = MB
REMPR(I) = MR
PRINT *, 'ARE BOTH FORCES FIRING SIMULTANEOUSLY THE '
PRINT *, ' PULSES? (1 IF YES, OR IF NO)
'
READ * , W
IF(W.EQ.O) GO TO 15
*
* PROGRAM EXECUTION
* BOTH FORCES FIRE SIMULTANEOUSLY
*
10 1=1+1
LOSSB(I) = (SFR*REAL(RUNITS)*MR*MDR*H - AFB*REAL(BUNITS)
*
+UPDNB(I-1) *NDB)/REMSPB(I-1)
IF(LOSSB(I) .LT.0.0) LOSSB(I) = 0.0
IF(LOSSB(I) .GE.1.0) LOSSB(I) = 0.999
REMSPB(I) = REMSPB(I-1)*(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
REMPB(I) = REMPB(I-1)*(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
UPDNB(I) = UPDNB(I-1)*(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
TLOSSB(I) = 1.0 - (REMSPB (I) /TOTSPB)
LOSSR(I) = (SFB*REAL(BUNITS)*MB*MDB*H - AFR*REAL(RUNITS)
+UPDNR(I-1) *NDR)/REMSPR(I-1)
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IF(LOSSR(I) .LT.O.O) LOSSR(I) = 0.0
IF(LOSSR(I) .GE.1.0) LOSSR(I) = 0.999
REMSPR(I) = REMSPR(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSR(I))
REMPR(I) = REMPR(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSR(I))
UPDNR(I) = UPDNR(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSR(I))
TLOSSR(I) = 1.0 - (REMSPR(I)/TOTSPR)
IF(((1.0 - TLOSSB(I) ) .LE.BRPNTB) .AND. ( (1.0 - TLOSSR(I) )
.
+LE.BRPNTR) ) GO TO 991
IF ((1.0 - TLOSSB ( I) ) .LE.BRPNTB) GO TO 992
IF ((1.0 - TLOSSR(I) ) .LE.BRPNTR) GO TO 993
MB = REMPB(I)
MR = REMPR(I)
IF(I.LT.NPULSE) GO TO 10
15 CONTINUE
IF(W.EQ.O) THEN
PRINT *, 'WHICH FORCE FIRES FIRST? NOTE : THAT MEANS '
PRINT *, 'THAT THE OTHER FORCE RECEIVES THE PULSE '
PRINT *, 'FIRST AND THEN RETURNS THE FIRE (0 FOR RED'
PRINT *, ' 1 FOR BLUE)
'
READ * , Z
IF(Z.EQ.l) GO TO 30
*
* RED FORCE FIRE FIRST
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20 1 = 1 + 1
LOSSB(I) = (SFR*REAL(RUNITS) *REMPR (1-1) *MDR*H - AFB*
+REAL(BUNITS) *UPDNB(I-1) *NDB) /REMSPB (1-1)
IF(LOSSB(I) .LT.0.0) LOSSB(I) = 0.0
IF(LOSSB(I) .GE.1.0) LOSSB(I) = 0.999
REMSPB (I) = REMSPB ( 1-1) *( 1.0 - LOSSB(I))
REMPB(I) = REMPB(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
UPDNB(I) = UPDNB(I-1)*(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
TLOSSB(I) = 1.0 - (REMSPB (I) /TOTSPB)
IF ((1.0 - TLOSSB(I) ) .LE.BRPNTB) GO TO 992]
LOSSR(I) =(SFB*REAL(BUNITS) *REMPB(I-1) *MDB*H - AFR*
+REAL(RUNITS) *UPDNR(I-1) *NDR) /REMSPR ( 1-1)
IF(LOSSR(I) .LT.0.0) LOSSR(I) =0.0
IF(LOSSR(I) .GE.1.0) LOSSR(I) = 0.999
REMSPR (I) = REMSPR ( 1-1) *( 1.0 - LOSSR(I))
REMPR(I) = REMPR(I-1)*(1.0 - LOSSR(I))
UPDNR(I) = UPDNR(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSR(I))
TLOSSR(I) = 1.0 - (REMSPR(I)/TOTSPR)
IF ((1.0 - TLOSSR(I) .LE.BRPNTR*TOTSPR) GO TO 993





BLUE FORCE FIRE FIRST
LOSSR(I) = (SFB*REAL(BUNITS)*REMPB(I-1) *MDB*H - AFR*
+REAL(RUNITS) *UPDNR(I-1) *NDR) /REMSPR ( 1-1
)
IF(LOSSR(I) .LT.O.O) LOSSR(I) = 0.0
IF(LOSSR(I) .GE.1.0) LOSSR(I) = 0.999
REMSPR (I) = REMSPR (1-1) *( 1.0 - LOSSR(I))
REMPR(I) = REMPR(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSR(I))
UPDNR(I) = UPDNR(I-l) * (1.0 - LOSSR(I))
TLOSSR(I) = 1.0 - (REMSPR ( I) /TOTSPR)
IF ((1.0 - TLOSSR(I) ) .LE.BRPNTR) GO TO 993
LOSSB(I) = (SFR*REAL(RUNITS) *REMPB(I-1) *MDR*H - AFB*
+REAL(BUNITS) *UPDNB(I-1) *NDB) /REMSPB ( 1-1
IF(LOSSB(I) . LT.O.O) LOSSB(I) = 0.0
IF(LOSSB(I) .GE.1.0) LOSSB(I) = 0.999
REMSPB(I) = REMSPB(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
REMPB(I) = REMPB(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
UPDNB(I) = UPDNB(I-l) *(1.0 - LOSSB(I))
TLOSSB(I) = 1.0 - (REMSPB (I) /TOTSPB)
IF((1.0 - TLOSSB(I) ) .LE.BRPNTB*TOTSPB) GO TO 992




CALL EXCMS( 'FILEDEF 10 DISK NAVCOM1 OUTPUT A')
WRITE (10 ,50)
WRITE(10,60)




DO 1500 S = 1,1
WRITE(10,70) S,TLOSSB(S) ,REMSPB(S)
1500 CONTINUE
50 FORMAT (5X, 'RED FORCE')
55 FORMAT ( 5X, 'BLUE FORCE')





DO 100 K = 1,1
IF( (REMSPR(K-l) .EQ.0.0) .OR. (REMSPB(K-l) .EQ.0.0) .OR.
+ ((REMSPB(K) - REMSPB(K-l) ) .EQ.0.0) ) THEN
IF(R(K-1) .GT.1.0) THEN







R(K) = ((REMSPR(K) - REMSPR (K-l ) ) /REMSPR (K-l ) )
/
+ ((REMSPB(K) - REMSPB(K-l) ) /REMSPB (K-l)
)
WRITE(10.75) K, R(K)


























991 CALL EXCMS( 'FILEDEF 10 DISK NAVCOM1 OUTPUT A')









DO 2500 S = 1,1
WRITE(10,700) S,TLOSSB(S) ,REMSPB(S)
2500 CONTINUE
500 FORMAT (5X, 'RED FORCE')
550 FORMAT ( 5X, 'BLUE FORCE')
600 FORMAT( '0' ,' #PULSES
'





DO 2 00 K = 1,1
IF( (REMSPR(K-l) .EQ.0.0) .OR. (REMSPB(K-l) . EQ . . ) .OR.
+ ((REMSPB(K) - REMSPB(K-l) ) .EQ.0.0) ) THEN
IF(R(K-1) .GT.1.0) THEN






R(K) = ((REMSPR(K) - REMSPR (K-l) ) /REMSPR (K-l) )
/
+ ((REMSPB(K) - REMSPB(K-l) ) /REMSPB (K-l)
)
WRITE(10.750) K, R(K)









CALL PLOTD(X,R,I, .TRUE. , 'LINLIN 1 , 'REM. STAYING POWER',













992 CALL EXCMS( ' FILEDEF 10 DISK NAVCOM1 OUTPUT A 1 )
WRITE (10, 899) 'RED FORCE REACHED THEIR BREAK POINT.'








DO 220 S = 1,1
WRITE(10,270) S,TLOSSB(S) ,REMSPB(S)
22 CONTINUE
250 FORMAT (5X, 'RED FORCE')
255 FORMAT ( 5X, 'BLUE FORCE')
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DO 4000 K = 1,1
IF( (REMSPR(K-l) .EQ.0.0) .OR. (REMSPB(K-l) .EQ.0.0) .OR.
+ ((REMSPB(K) - REMSPB(K-l) ) .EQ.0.0) ) THEN
IF(R(K-1) .GT.1.0) THEN






R(K) = ((REMSPR(K) - REMSPR (K-l) ) /REMSPR (K-l) )
/
+ ((REMSPB(K) - REMSPB(K-l) ) /REMSPB (K-l)
)
WRITE(10.7) K, R(K)













CALL PLOTD(X,R,I, .TRUE. , 'LINLIN' , 'REM. STAYING POWER',
+ ' (DREMSPR/REMSPR)/ (DREMSPB/REMSPB) * , ' #SALVOS '
,
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APPENDIX B. COMPUTER PROGRAM TO CALCULATE FOR VARIOUS VALUES
OF SCOUTING AND ALERTNESS
The following is a listing of program codes written to
examine all possible values of oRI xR , o B , and \ B from 0.60 to
0.95 in increments of 0.05, as described in Chapter IV,
Section B.2. The program was coded in Fortran 77 and run on






* ALL SHIPS OF BOTH FORCES ARE EQUIVALENT
* ALL UNITS HAVE THE SAME STRIKING POWER
* ALL UNITS HAVE THE SAME DEFENSIVE POWER
* ALL UNITS HAVE THE SAME STAYING POWER
* THE RED FORCE RESPECTIVE IN THE PROGRAM BY ALFA AND THE
* BLUE FORCE BY THE BETA
INTEGER ALFA2 , ALFA3 , BETA2 , BETA3 , I , J , V ,
W
REAL K , H , SCALFA , SCBETA , ALTALFA , ALTBETA , ROENA , RODUO
REAL ARRAY1(10,10) , ARRAY2 ( 10 , 10)
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PRINT *, 'PLEASE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING DATA FOR BOTH
OPPONENTS
'
PRINT *, 'BE CAREFUL, THE FIRST VALUE YOU ENTER TO BE FOR'
PRINT *, 'THE ALFA FORCE AND THE SECOND FOR THE BETA
+ FORCE
'
PRINT *, ' '










READ * , H
'ENTER THE UNIT SALVO STRIKING POWER IN HITS
'OF BOTH FORCES (INTEGER)
'
ALFA2 , BETA2
'ENTER THE DEFENSIVE POWER FOR BOTH FORCES'
ALFA3 , BETA3
'ENTER THE PROBABILITY OF HIT VS UNDEFENDED
CALL EXCMS( 'FILEDEF 10 DISK SENSIT OUTPUT A')
IF(K.EQ.l) THEN
WRITE (10,5) ' THE TWO ( 2 ) FORCES ARE EQUAL
'
ELSE




WRITE(10,15) 'THE UNIT STRIKING POWER IN HITS OF ALFA
+FORCE IS 1 ,ALFA2
WRITE (10, 16) • AND FOR THE BETA FORCE IS ' , BETA2
WRITE (10 ,17) 'THE UNIT DEFENSIVE POWER OF ALFA FORCE IS'
+ ,ALFA3
WRITE (10, 18) ' AND FOR THE B FORCE IS ' , BETA3
*
DO 800 V = 1,8
SCBETA = 0.05*REAL(V+5) + 0.3
DO 700 W = 1,8
ALTBETA = . 05*REAL(W+5) + 0.3
1 =
100 CONTINUE
1 = 1 + 1
SCALFA = 0.05*REAL(I+5) + 0.3
J =
2 00 CONTINUE
J = J + 1
ALTALFA = . 05*REAL (J+5 ) + 0.3
IF( (K*REAL(ALFA2)*H*SCALFA) . EQ
.
+ (ALTBETA*REAL(BETA3) ) ) THEN
ROENA = INF
GO TO 3 00
ENDIF
ROENA = (REAL(ALFA2) *H* (SCBETA*REAL (BETA2 ) *H
+ - K*REAL(ALFA3)*ALTALFA) ) / (REAL (ALFA3 )
*
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IF(J.LT.8) GO TO 200
IF(I.LT.8) GO TO 100
WRITE(10,400) 'FOR SCOUTING OF BETA FORCE '
,
SCBETA
+ ' AND ALERTNESS OF BETA FORCE ', ALTBETA
WRITE(10,350)
WRITE (10 ,320) 'ALTALFA'
WRITE(10,310)
WRITE(10,250)
250 FORMAT ( IX , 'SCALFA')
310 FORMAT(10X, ' ')
320 FORMAT (IX, A, • 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
+ 0.95 ' )
350 FORMAT(10X, '
400 F0RMAT(1X,A,F5.2,A,F5.2)
DO 600 I = 1,8










WRITE (10, 5) 'THE TWO (2) FORCES ARE EQUAL'
ELSE





WRITE (10, 15) 'THE UNIT STRIKING POWER IN HITS OF ALFA
+FORCE IS' ,ALFA2
WRITE(10, 16) ' AND FOR THE BETA FORCE IS ' , BETA2
WRITE (10, 17) 'THE UNIT DEFENSIVE POWER OF ALFA FORCE IS'
+ ,ALFA3
WRITE (10, 18) ' AND FOR THE B FORCE IS ' , BETA3
5 FORMAT (IX, A)
12 F0RMAT(1X,A,F5.2,A)
15 FORMAT (IX, A, 12)
16 FORMAT (IX, A, 12)
17 FORMAT (IX, A, 12)
18 FORMAT (IX, A, 12)
*
DO 8 I = 1,8
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SCALFA = 0.05*REAL(I+5) + 0.30
DO 7 J = 1,8
ALTALFA = . 05*REAL(J+5) + 0.3
V =
10 CONTINUE
V = V + 1
SCBETA = 0.05*REAL(V+5) + 0.3
W =
2 CONTINUE
W = W + 1
ALTBETA = . 05*REAL(W+5) +0.30
IF( (K*REAL(BETA2) *H*SCBETA) . EQ
.




RODUO = (REAL(BETA2) *H* (SCALFA*REAL (ALFA2 ) *H
+ - K*REAL(BETA3)*ALTBETA) ) / (REAL (BETA3 )
*
+ (K*REAL(BETA2) *SCBETA*H - ALTALFA*REAL (ALFA3 ) )
)





IF(W.LT.8) GO TO 2
IF(V.LT.8) GO TO 10
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WRITE (10, 40) 'FOR SCOUTING OF ALFA FORCE ' , SCALFA
+ AND ALERTNESS OF ALFA FORCE ' , ALTALFA
WRITE (10, 35)
WRITE (10, 32) 'ALTBETA'
WRITE (10, 31)
WRITE(10,25)
2 5 FORMAT ( IX , • SCBETA
'
)
31 FORMAT(10X, ' ')



















Tables I, II, and III show the output of the Appendix B
computer program (that is, the ratios p 1 and p 2 ) as described
in Chapter IV, Section B.3. The values represented in this
APPENDIX are: a 2 = P 2 = 3 and a 3 = P 3 = 2 .
Each table represents a different force condition, as
described below. The description appears in the upper left
corner of each table.
Tables la and lb
The Alpha force is 0.75 times as large as the Beta
force.
The Unit Striking Power in hits of the Alpha force is
3 and for the Beta force is 3
.
The Unit Defensive Power of the Alpha force is 2 and
for the Beta force is 2.
Tables Ila and lib
Both forces are equal in size.
The Unit Striking Power in hits of the Alpha force is
3 and for the Beta force is 3
The Unit Defensive Power of the Alpha force is 2 and
for the Beta force is 2.
Tables Ilia and Illb
The Alpha force is 1.50 times as large as the Beta
force.
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The Unit Striking Power in hits of the Alpha force is
3 and for the Beta force is 3.
The Unit Defensive Power of the Alpha force is 2 and
for the Beta force is 2.
The following variable names are used in accompanying
Tables I, II, and III instead of the terms used in Chapter IV.
Their location is as illustrated in the sample below.
A force = Red force
= Blue force
= Alertness of Red force
= Alertness of Blue force
= Scouting effectiveness of Red force
= Scouting effectiveness of Blue force.
TABLE la, IIa f Ilia
FOR SCOUTING OF ALFA FORCE AND ALERTNESS OF ALFA FORCE. . . .









TABLE lb, lib, Illb
FOR SCOUTING OF BETA FORCE. . . . AND ALERTNESS OF BETA FORCE,





























































Tables I, II, and III show the output of the Appendix B
computer program (that is, the ratios pj^ and p 2 ) as described
in Chapter IV, Section B.3. The values represented in this
APPENDIX are: P 2 = 4 > oc 2 = 3 and P 3 = 3 > oc 3 = 2 .
Each table represents a different force condition, as
described below. The description appears in the upper left
corner of each table.
Tables la and lb
Both forces are equal in size.
The Unit Striking Power in hits of the Alpha force is
3 and for the Beta force is 4
.
The Unit Defensive Power of the Alpha force is 2 and
for the Beta force is 3.
Tables Ila and lib
The Alpha force is 1.50 times as large as the Beta
force.
The Unit Striking Power in hits of the Alpha force is
3 and for the Beta force is 4
The Unit Defensive Power of the Alpha force is 2 and
for the Beta force is 3.
Tables Ilia and Illb
The Alpha force is 2 times as large as the Beta force.
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The Unit Striking Power in hits of the Alpha force is
3 and for the Beta force is 4
.
The Unit Defensive Power of the Alpha force is 2 and
for the Beta force is 3
.
The following variable names are used in accompanying
Tables I, II, and III instead of the terms used in Chapter IV.
Their location is as illustrated in the sample below.
A force = Red force
B force = Blue force
ALTALFA = Alertness of Red force
ALTBETA = Alertness of Blue force
SCALFA = Scouting effectiveness of Red force
SCBETA = Scouting effectiveness of Blue force.
TABLE la, Ila, Ilia
FOR SCOUTING OF ALFA FORCE AND ALERTNESS OF ALFA FORCE





TABLE lb, lib, Illb
FOR SCOUTING OF BETA FORCE AND ALERTNESS OF BETA FORCE
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